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We  study  the  transmission  of  risk  attitudes  in a unique  survey  of mothers  and  children  in
which  both  participated  in  an incentivized  risk preference  elicitation  task.  We  document
that  risk  preferences  are correlated  between  mothers  and children  when  the  children  are
just 7–8 years  old.  This  correlation  is  only  present  for daughters.  We  further  show  that  a
measure  of  maternal  involvement  is  a  strong  moderator  of the association  between  moth-
ers’  and  daughters’  risk  tolerance.  This  is  consistent  with  a role  for  socialization  and parental
investment  in  the  intergenerational  transmission  of risk  preferences.
©  2016  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the  CC
BY  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. IntroductionPreferences and attitudes such as risk tolerance, patience and the propensity to trust are important determinants of
individual choices and outcomes across a range of domains (e.g. Cramer et al., 2002; Anderson and Mellor, 2008; Castillo
et al., 2011; Dohmen et al., 2011). There has been growing interest in understanding the development and determinants
of these preferences. Moreover, many choices, such as occupation or education, and outcomes such as earnings, are highly
 We  thank Berna Akcinar, Gozde Corekcioglu, Nagihan Imer and Semih Sezer for assistance with the data. We would like to thank the editor, the referees,
participants at the Royal Economic Society Annual Meeting 2013, the 2013 North American ESA meetings, and seminar participants at Stanford University,
the  University of Cambridge, GATE Lyon, CEMFI, Bilkent University and Koc¸ University for helpful comments. The ECDET Survey was  funded by The Scientiﬁc
and  Technological Research Council of Turkey (TUBITAK grants 106K347 and 109K525). Supplementary funds for the ECDET study were provided by the
College of Social Sciences and Humanities. The speciﬁc research reported here was  made possible by additional support from the College of Administrative
Sciences and Economics at Koc¸ University. Boneva was supported by an ESRC Doctoral Fellowship (ES/J500033/1). Crossley also acknowledges support from
the  ESRC (reference RES-000-22-4264) and from the ESRC-funded Centre for Microeconomic Analysis of Public Policy (CPP, reference RES-544-28-5001).
Ertac acknowledges support from the Turkish Academy of the Sciences.
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: salan@essex.ac.uk (S. Alan).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2016.12.014
0167-2681/© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/
4.0/).
p
s
t
i
2
a
c
l
a
D
s
t
m
o
c
s
i
o
p
t
m
t
r
o
m
r
s
t
m
m
i
c
b
2
i
l
d
(
t
t
p
p
2
2
T
t
s
o
t
sS. Alan et al. / Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 134 (2017) 60–77 61
ersistent across generations within families (Black and Devereux, 2011). This draws attention to the role of the family in
haping children’s preferences and attitudes (Deckers et al., 2015). While intergenerational persistence may  partly reﬂect
he intergenerational transmission of ability (Black et al., 2009), recent theoretical models emphasize a key role for the
ntergenerational transmission of preferences and attitudes in the persistence of choices and outcomes (Bisin and Verdier,
000, 2001; Doepke and Zilibotti, 2012; Dohmen et al., 2012). Thus, empirical evidence is needed on the extent to which
nd the mechanisms by which attitudes and preferences are transmitted across generations.
In this paper we study the transmission of risk preferences in a unique nationally representative survey of mothers and
hildren in which both participated in an incentivized risk preference elicitation task. This study builds on the previous
iterature in a number of ways. First, the children we study are just 7–8 years old. Kimball et al. (2009), Dohmen et al. (2012)
nd Zumbuehl et al. (2013) demonstrate that the risk preferences of adult children are correlated with those of their parents.
etermining whether this correlation already exists in childhood is an important step in the understanding of the transmis-
ion process. Second, the risk preferences of both mothers and children are measured in an incentivized risk task (rather
han by survey measures that have been shown to be correlated with preferences elicited in an incentivized task). Third, the
others and children we study are participants in a large and nationally representative interdisciplinary longitudinal study
f child development. This has several important advantages. On the one hand, it allows us to study the intergenerational
orrelation of preferences in a large and representative sample. Conducting studies with representative samples is important
ince preferences measured in non-representative samples have been shown to differ markedly from preferences measured
n representative samples (e.g. Falk et al., 2013; Slonim et al., 2013). On the other hand, since the data collection was part
f an interdisciplinary study, detailed information is available on children’s characteristics and upbringing, the mothers’
arenting behaviors and attitudes, as well as household and regional characteristics. This information is collected prospec-
ively and contemporaneously (not retrospectively), and contains measures, which capture the degree of effort, which the
other exerts to raise and socialize the child. This is particularly interesting because recent theoretical models of preference
ransmission assume that the transmission is inﬂuenced by parental investment choices (see Bisin and Verdier, 2011, for a
eview of this literature).
We  ﬁnd that risk preferences are correlated between mothers and children when the children are just 7–8 years old. In
ur data, the correlation is driven entirely by mothers and daughters. Moreover, for daughters, the degree of transmission is
onotonically increasing in maternal involvement or effort. This relationship is robust to controlling for other known cor-
elates of risk taking. As we have no means of experimentally manipulating parental effort, we  cannot rule out all possible
ources of endogeneity, or provide conclusive evidence on the mechanism. However, our data do allow us to assess whether
he association between parental effort and preference transmission is driven by reverse causality from child attitudes to
aternal effort, and this does not appear to be the case. These ﬁndings are consistent with the hypothesis that the trans-
ission of attitudes from parents to children is responsive to parental effort, and so highlight a possible role of socialization
n the development of risk preferences in children.
This study contributes to the literature that studies preferences and economic decision-making of children and adoles-
ents, such as attitudes toward risk and uncertainty (Harbaugh et al., 2002; Sutter et al., 2013; Castillo et al., 2015), rational
ehavior (Harbaugh et al., 2001; Castillo et al., 2015), time preference (Bettinger and Slonim, 2007; Castillo et al., 2011,
015), and competitiveness (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2004). Our ﬁndings also relate to the role of nurture relative to nature
n shaping preferences, which is a central question in both social and biological sciences. While some twin studies high-
ight the role of genetics in the development of risk preferences (e.g. Cesarini et al., 2009; Zyphur et al., 2009), studies that
ocument cultural differences in the development of attitudes such as competitiveness suggest the importance of nurture
e.g., Andersen et al., 2012). The latter group of studies highlight a role for socialization by showing that the intergenera-
ional correlation in preferences is moderated by aggregate or “macro” variables (for example, whether the family belongs
o a matrilineal or patriarchal society). In contrast, we  examine whether the intergenerational correlation of attitudes and
references is moderated by family-level (or “micro”) variables, such as the extent of parental investments in children.
Section 2 describes our data and sample in greater detail, as well as the risk preference elicitation procedure. Section 3
resents the results, and Section 4 concludes.
. Data and summary statistics
.1. The ECDET study
The children and mothers in our study are participants in the “Study of Early Childhood Developmental Ecologies in
urkey” (ECDET). ECDET is a longitudinal survey that has been developed by a team of social scientists to explore in depth
he developmental environment of young children and its effects on the development of cognitive and non-cognitive skills,
tarting from the age of 3 (Baydar et al., 2010). The ECDET survey follows a nationally representative sample of just over
ne thousand 3-year-old children and their mothers, drawn from 19 different regions in Turkey.1 Data are collected through
1 More information on the sampling methodology can be found in Baydar et al. (2010). Data from the ﬁrst wave of the ECDET survey has been compared
o  population-representative micro-data from the Turkish Statistical Institute. In terms of observable characteristics such as age, education and marital
tatus, the ECDET data corresponds very well with a population-representative sample of mothers with own children aged 3–5. Over the ﬁve waves of
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home visits that last 2–3 h. Participants have been surveyed annually since 2008. The dataset contains an extraordinarily rich
set of variables, which are useful for our analysis. For example, we have detailed information on household characteristics,
the socio-economic background of the family, and the cognitive ability of the child. These allow us to directly control for
important determinants of risk behavior. Importantly, we  also have extensive information on parenting behaviors and the
level of effort mothers and fathers exert to raise their child, and these provide an opportunity to investigate the preference
transmission mechanism in greater detail.
We designed a risk module for mothers and children, and ﬁelded it in the course of the 5th wave of data collection in
the ECDET study, which took place in 2012. Further details are given below. The analysis reported in this paper is based
on data collected in the 5th wave of data collection although some measures are drawn from earlier waves (where noted).
The ECDET study, including the risk module, does not collect data directly from fathers, due to their limited willingness to
participate.2 Nevertheless the survey data contain some information on fathers provided to us by mothers, which we utilize
in our analyses.
2.2. Characteristics of the children, mothers and the environment
In the Wave 5 data the households in our sample have on average 5.1 members, out of which 2.7 are children. The children
are between 6.8 and 8.9 years old. The mothers are on average 34 years old and have 5.9 years of education. Only 17% report
being engaged in gainful employment. Out of those women  who  are not working, 99% classify themselves as housewives.
Almost all women are married (98%) and out of those who  are married, 94% report having a husband who is working. The
fathers of the children are on average more educated than the mothers and have an average of 7.4 years of education.
Prior research has documented an association between religiosity and risk taking (e.g. Benjamin et al., 2010). The dataset
contains several items concerning the degree to which the mother is involved in religious activities, which we use to construct
a proxy for religiosity. Since risk preferences over small gambles might systematically differ with the household’s wealth
we also control for the household’s socio-economic status in the analysis. We  use information on the household’s monthly
expenditure levels and the family’s material belongings to construct a measure of the household’s socio-economic status.
First, we obtain a measure of material wealth by extracting a common factor from the single response items of a detailed
material wealth questionnaire (Filmer and Scott, 2012). In a second step, we  extract a common factor from both the per
capita expenditure of the household and the material wealth measure obtained in the ﬁrst step. This procedure allows us to
effectively combine information from both sources.
2.3. The incentivized risk preference elicitation task
We  use an incentivized elicitation task for both mothers and children to measure risk preferences. The task is based on
Gneezy and Potters (1997), whereby subjects receive a certain amount of money and are asked to divide this endowment
(W) between a risky and a riskless option. The major advantage of this task is that it is intuitive and easy to understand, and
that it involves a single decision. Ease of implementation and comprehension is particularly important for our purposes, as
our subjects are young children.3
In our task, the risky option has a 50% chance of generating a good outcome, in which case the amount invested is tripled.
In the alternative case of a bad outcome, the money invested into the risky option is lost. Total earnings equal the payoff from
the risky investment plus the amount kept in the safe option. The expected value of investing 3 · R · 12 + (W − R) is increasing
in the invested amount (R). Therefore, a risk-neutral or risk-loving person should invest all the endowment, whereas a
risk-averse person will invest a smaller amount. The amount invested into the risky option is a measure of risk tolerance.
This elicitation task has been successfully used in a number of experimental studies both in the lab and in the ﬁeld, and on
different populations ranging from undergraduate students to ﬁnancial investors and rural residents in different cultures
(see Charness and Gneezy, 2012, for a review).
We  use the same incentivized elicitation task for both mothers and children, with the main difference being that the
mother’s risk task involves monetary incentives, whereas the children’s risk task uses toys to incentivize decisions. In the
risk elicitation task of the mother, the mother is given an endowment of 10 tokens, each corresponding to 1 Turkish Lira (TL).
She has the option of putting any number of tokens into a “risky bowl”.4 The earnings from the risky bowl are determined
the survey, the sample has been subject to some attrition (about 20%), which seems to have occurred predominantly among higher socio-economic status
households.
2 Pretesting suggested that, in this population, attempting to survey fathers directly would not only generate limited responses but could also adversely
impact the number of mothers that participated in the survey.
3 See Charness et al. (2013) for a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of different risk preference elicitation techniques. The authors argue
that  in terms of understanding individual differences, simple elicitation techniques as the one we use fair better. Theoretically, the disadvantage of the
task  is that it cannot distinguish between risk-neutral and risk-seeking individuals, since both types would invest all tokens into the risky option. In a
sample of risk-averse individuals, however, higher risk aversion implies less investment. Given the prevalence of risk aversion in laboratory settings, the
task  works well to compare individuals in terms of their risk attitudes. The task has been used in many studies assessing individual and gender differences
in  risk preferences and has produced consistent results (see Charness et al., 2013). More recently, it has been successfully implemented in a large sample
of  elementary school children in Turkey (Alan and Ertac, 2014), which is comparable to the sample reported in the current paper.
4 We used an actual bowl and actual tokens, and the mother physically placed the tokens into the bowl.
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y the outcome of a draw from an opaque urn that has one yellow and one purple ball. If the yellow ball is drawn, the good
utcome occurs and the tokens in the bowl are tripled. If the purple ball is drawn, the bad outcome occurs and the tokens
n the bowl are lost.
We took great care to ensure that the procedures were transparent, in the sense that the mother could see that there
ere exactly two balls in the urn, that they were the same size etc. After making the decision of how many tokens to place in
he risky bowl, the mother drew the ball herself, and was  paid her earnings in cash immediately afterwards. In the mothers’
isk game, participants could win up to 30 TL, which corresponds to about 17 US dollars. This constitutes about 15% of the
edian per capita monthly expenditure for participants in our study.
The risk elicitation of the child followed similar procedures but to ease the comprehension of the task and the calculation
f potential payoffs the child was only given 4 tokens. Each of these tokens corresponded to a single “gift” of choice from
 gift bag that had a variety of small items of value to children such as toys, stationery, beads, hair bands etc. The gift bag
ontained a good mix  of toys that would appeal to both genders (this and other aspects of the task were carefully pretested).
okens placed in the risky bowl were either tripled or lost, and the outcome was again determined by the draw of the yellow
r purple ball from the opaque urn. The child drew the ball himself/herself.
To ensure that both mothers and children understand the task, the interviewers carefully explained the rules. After
emonstrating the potential outcomes of two hypothetical investment choices, the interviewers asked the participants to
alculate what the potential outcomes would be for several other hypothetical investment choices. The interviewers were
nstructed to only proceed with the task if the participants were able to answer the questions correctly.
To make sure that the child would not be affected by the mother’s decision, the sequencing was  such that the child went
hrough the risk task ﬁrst. Moreover, to prevent realized outcomes from affecting subsequent decisions, all realizations and
ayments took place after the choices of both the child and the mother were collected.5 The interviewers were instructed
o ensure that the child decides autonomously, and the presence of or any interference by the mother was recorded. In
ctuality, the mother was present in the room in 56% of the cases while the child was playing the risk game.6
To ensure that our estimation results are not confounded by the presence of the mother, we  conduct robustness tests in
hich we directly control for the presence of the mother and the interaction of the presence of the mother with the mother’s
isk tolerance.7 Neither do we ﬁnd a direct effect of the mother’s presence on the risk taking behavior of the child nor does
he mother’s presence moderate the relationship between her risk taking behavior and her child’s risk taking behavior. The
nclusion of these variables does not materially alter any of the results we report below. This is perhaps not surprising, given
hat the interviewers reported that in only 1.6% of the cases the mother said something during the game that might have
otentially affected the child’s choice. Our results are also robust to the exclusion of these few cases.
Our data contain the incentivized risk choices of 746 child–mother pairs. Out of their 4 tokens, the children choose to
nvest on average 2.14 tokens. We  ﬁnd boys to be more risk tolerant than girls. In particular, the mean investment of boys
s 2.2 tokens, while it is 2.1 for girls. While this difference is not very large, it is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Most
tudies that investigate gender differences in risk taking among adults ﬁnd men  to be more risk tolerant than women (e.g.
ckel and Grossman, 2008; Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Borghans et al., 2009; Charness and Gneezy, 2012). Sutter et al. (2013)
nvestigate the risk taking behavior of children and adolescents aged 10–18 and also ﬁnd boys to be more risk tolerant than
irls. Fig. 1 displays the distribution of choices by gender. On average, the mothers choose to invest 4.5 tokens out of their
0 tokens. Fig. 2 presents the distribution of the mothers’ risk taking behavior in the task.
Risk taking in the Gneezy–Potters task has shown considerable variation across different populations. A comparison
uggests that the mothers in our population are not atypically risk averse or risk tolerant. Charness and Gneezy (2012)
eport investments for females ranging from about 40% to 60% of the endowment in populations of students and traders,
nd ranging from 4% to 50% of the endowment in rural populations. Ertac and Gurdal (2012) employ the task on Turkish
ndergraduates, and document risk taking among women to be around 45–54%.8 Finally, Charness and Viceisza (2011) use
he task with the same parameterization as ours, and ﬁnd the average investment level of a rural sample in Senegal to be
8.7%.
Previous studies have shown that behavior in the incentivized risk task is predicted by answers to hypothetical questions
oncerning risk (Dohmen et al., 2011). Our study additionally includes a hypothetical large stake investment question. In
his hypothetical task, mothers were asked how much they would invest into a risky business if they won  50,000 TL in a
ottery. The investment into the risky option would be either doubled or lost, with equal probability. The mother’s risk taking
ehavior in the incentivized risk task, which involves fairly small stakes, correlates signiﬁcantly with her responses to the
arge stake hypothetical investment question.95 Translated verbatim instructions and procedures are provided in Appendix B.
6 Note that mothers’ presence in the room was not signiﬁcantly related to the gender of the child. Mothers were present in 55% of all cases in which the
hild  was  a girl, and she was present in 57% of all cases in which the child was a boy. The difference is not statistically signiﬁcant (p-value = 0.26).
7 The results of these robustness tests can be found in Appendix C.
8 It should be noted that the treatments and procedures in these studies show some variation.
9 The Spearman rank correlation coefﬁcient between the mothers’ choices on the incentivized task and the choices on the hypothetical investment
uestion is 0.23 and the correlation is signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
64 S. Alan et al. / Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 134 (2017) 60–77
Fig. 1. Children’s choices in risk task, by gender.Fig. 2. Mothers’ choices in the risk task.
2.4. Parenting measures
As noted above, a key assumption in recent theoretical models is that the degree to which a parent’s preferences are
transmitted to the child might crucially depend on the degree of effort that the parent exerts to raise and socialize the child.
The information in our dataset allows us to construct different measures of such parental effort. In particular, mothers were
asked to report their own and their husband’s involvement in the upbringing of the target child, i.e. the child which was part
of the TECGE study.
Our ﬁrst measure of parental effort is based on detailed information about how involved each parent is in activities that
are related to the child’s school life. More speciﬁcally, the mothers are asked to report how often they and their husbands
engage in certain school-related activities. For example, questions include how often each parent helps the child with his/her
homework and other school projects, to what extent the parent is interested in the child’s problems at school, how often
the parent shows interest in the child’s activities by for example watching the child’s performances, or how often the parent
S. Alan et al. / Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 134 (2017) 60–77 65
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ets involved in the child’s school life by attending teacher–parent meetings.10 Responses are recorded in ﬁve categories
anging from never (1) to always (5). Overall, mothers report that they are more involved in their children’s school life than
heir husbands. While the average response mothers give for their own  involvement is 4.3, the average response they give
or their husbands is only 2.5. For both mother’s and father’s involvement there is considerable variation in the mothers’
esponses, which we will exploit in our analysis. Fig. 3 shows the distribution of the mothers’ responses separately for
other’s involvement and father’s involvement.
Mothers exert slightly more effort when raising a daughter (average response of 4.39 compared to 4.30), while fathers’
ffort when raising a son or daughter is not statistically different. There is a small but statistically signiﬁcant positive
orrelation between the mother’s and the father’s effort choices.11
Our second measure of effort additionally includes information about activities that are unrelated to schooling.10 For
xample, the additional questions include whether the parent helps the child learn new skills such as swimming, whether the
arent engages in different activities together with the child like playing indoors or outdoors, and whether the parent takes
he child to children’s theaters or other performances. Since the responses are coded in different ways, instead of calculating
n average we extract a common factor from all item responses including the questions in the schooling questionnaire.
ince the mothers were not asked these additional questions about the involvement of fathers but only themselves, we  can
onstruct this second measure of effort only for mothers. The extracted factor explains about 32% of all the variation in item
esponses. Fig. 4 shows the distribution of this measure of effort.
Finally, the rich nature of the dataset allows us to investigate the potential effect different parenting behaviors have on
he risk taking behavior of the child. In the ECDET survey parenting behaviors are measured by the Turkish adaptation of
The Child Rearing Questionnaire” (Paterson and Sanson, 1999; Yagmurlu and Sanson, 2009). From these items we  extract
our different subscales: (i) whether the mother is obedience demanding, (ii) whether the mother uses physical punish-
ent, (iii) the degree of maternal warmth, and (iv) the degree of inductive reasoning. The inductive reasoning subscale
core measures the degree to which the mother explains the rationale of the rules and the reasons for disciplining the
hild.
.5. Cognitive measuresStudies conducted with adult participants have found more cognitively able individuals to be more risk tolerant (Frederick,
005; Burks et al., 2009; Dohmen et al., 2010). To control for cognitive ability and to assess whether this relationship also
olds in our sample of young children we employ several measures of cognitive ability.
10 The full list of questions used for the different measures of effort can be found in Appendix A.
11 The Spearman rank correlation is 0.13 and it is signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
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One cognitive measure we employ is The Turkish Receptive Language Test (Berument and Guven, 2010). Receptive
language is widely known as a strong indicator of general cognitive abilities and school achievement. In this test, children
are presented with several pictures of objects and they need to point to the picture that displays the object announced by
the interviewer. The scores used in the regressions are estimates of receptive language ability that are obtained by ﬁtting a
three-parameter logistic Item Response Theory model standardized for the child’s age (Baydar et al., 2014).
The second cognitive measure that is used as a control is the Corsi visual-spatial memory score (Corsi, 1972), which is
obtained by a “game” of remembering sequences of locations. The test involves mimicking the interviewer as he/she taps
sequences of spatially separated blocks. It is measured in Round 4 of the ECDET survey when the children were approximately
6 years old. The scores used in the present analyses are age-standardized.
Finally, in order to control for impulsivity of the children, we  use a test of inhibitory control, referred to as the “head-to-
toes” test (Ponitz et al., 2008). The task involves asking the child to touch his/her head when the interviewer says toe and
vice versa, and recording response times. This test was given to the children when they were approximately 4 years old, in
Round 2 of the ECDET study. A higher score indicates a higher ability of the child to use inhibition to suppress a prevailing
response. Inhibitory control is one of a subset of cognitive abilities labeled executive function.
3. Results
The child’s risk taking behavior correlates positively and signiﬁcantly with the mother’s risk taking behavior in the incen-
tivized risk task (corr = 0.14, p-value = 0.023).12 This observation is consistent with the evidence presented in Dohmen et al.
(2012), who ﬁnd parents’ risk preferences to be correlated with their adult children’s risk preferences. Our data demonstrate
that the positive correlation is already present at very young ages, which suggests that the preference transmission process
starts very early in life. The result contrasts with evidence on the intergenerational transmission of patience. In particular,
Bettinger and Slonim (2007) ﬁnd that there is no signiﬁcant correlation between the patience of parents and children, which
suggests that the family environment plays a different role in the formation of different preferences in childhood. Fig. 5
shows the proportion of girls and boys who put each possible number of tokens into the risky bowl, given the choices made
by their mothers. To ease interpretation, mothers’ choices are grouped into ﬁve categories. While the correlation between
mother’s and daughter’s risk preferences is very strong and signiﬁcant for girls (corr=0.23, p-value=0.002), it is much weaker
and statistically insigniﬁcant for boys (corr = 0.08, p-value = 0.293).
We perform a number of regression analyses to investigate the relationship between mothers’ and children’s preferences
in greater detail. To facilitate the interpretation of the coefﬁcients we express mothers’ and children’s investment choices
as fractions of the total numbers of tokens. The regression results conﬁrm that the risk taking behavior of the mother in
the incentivized risk task signiﬁcantly predicts the risk taking behavior of the child. In particular, if the mother invests
10 percentage points more, the child’s investment is on average 1.4 percentage points higher (Table 1, Column 1). This
relationship is robust to the inclusion of region ﬁxed effects (Column 2), and to the inclusion of the gender of the child as
a control variable (Column 3). Since Turkey is a large country with signiﬁcant regional variation in levels of development,
conservatism, religiosity and ethnicity, it is natural to explore whether there is signiﬁcant regional variation in risk aversion.
We ﬁnd that regional ﬁxed effects capture signiﬁcant variation in children’s choices (note the increase in R2 from Column
12 All p-values reported in this section account for clustering at the regional level.
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Fig. 5. Children’s choices conditional on mother’s choice.
Table 1
Mothers’ and children’s risk tolerance (0–1).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mother’s risk (0–1) (ˇ1) 0.142** 0.124** 0.127**
(0.0568) (0.0511) (0.0512)
Male (ˇ2) 0.0539*** 0.114**
(0.0184) (0.0404)
Mother’s risk × male (ˇ3) 0.0600
(0.0764)
Mother’s risk × female (ˇ4) 0.194***
(0.0497)
N  746 746 746 746
Regional FE No Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.02 0.09 0.10 0.10
Test  ˇ3 = ˇ4 (p-value) 0.11
Both mother’s and child’s risk tolerance is measured on a 0–1 scale.
Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the region level).
* p < .1.
1
a
t
h** p < .05.
*** p < .01.
–2 of Table 1) and therefore control for regional ﬁxed effects in all of the following regressions. As noted previously, boys
re more risk tolerant than girls, and invest 5 percentage points more on average. Interestingly, while the mother’s risk
aking behavior has substantial predictive power for the behavior of girls, this is not the case for boys (Column 4), although
ere the two coefﬁcients do not differ statistically signiﬁcantly (p-value = 0.11).
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Table 2
Predictors of children’s risk tolerance (0–1).
(1) (2)
Girls Boys
Mother’s risk (0–1) (ˇ1) 0.225*** 0.0139
(0.0632) (0.0832)
Corsi test 0.00215 0.00186
(0.00213) (0.00212)
Turkish receptive language test −0.0000321 0.00116
(0.00143) (0.00104)
Head–toe task −0.00210 −0.00659***
(0.00158) (0.00145)
Child age (months) −0.000344 0.00739**
(0.00483) (0.00325)
Height 0.00267 0.00420
(0.00204) (0.00245)
Religiosity 0.000215 0.000299
(0.000690) (0.000580)
Household size −0.0137* −0.0149
(0.00666) (0.00984)
Mother’s education (years) 0.00683 0.00117
(0.00654) (0.00433)
Father’s education (years) −0.00447 0.00253
(0.000520) (0.00351)
SES 1st quartile (low) 0.142** 0.0436
(0.0641) (0.0748)
SES 2nd quartile 0.190*** 0.0391
(0.0516) (0.0694)
SES 3rd quartile 0.0448 0.0188
(0.0396) (0.0457)
N  311 375
Regional FE Yes Yes
R2 0.19 0.17
Test ˇ1(girls) = ˇ1(boys) 0.03
Both mother’s and child’s risk tolerance is measured on a 0–1 scale.
Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the region level).* p < .1.
** p < .05.
*** p < .01.
In the following analyses, we allow all coefﬁcients to differ for boys and girls by estimating two  separate equations
(Table 2). We  add a number of control variables that have previously been shown to be important correlates of risk prefer-
ences. In particular, we  control for individual characteristics such as the child’s cognitive ability test scores, age (in months),
and height. Moreover, we control for household characteristics such as household size, religiosity of the family and the
parents’ education levels (in years), and we include dummies for the three lowest socio-economic status quartiles. The
results reveal that an increase in the mother’s investment by 10 percentage points increases her daughter’s investment by
2.3 percentage points, controlling for these predictors. This effect is signiﬁcant at the 1% level. At the same time, the mother’s
investment has no predictive power for the risk tolerance of her son.13 When we test for equality of coefﬁcients, we ﬁnd
that there is a signiﬁcant difference between the coefﬁcient on mother’s risk in the regression for girls and the coefﬁcient
on mother’s risk in the regression for boys (p-value = 0.03). This ﬁnding suggests that mothers’ preferences are differentially
transmitted to the next generation depending on the gender of the child.14
The literature reports that risk-tolerance is signiﬁcantly related to cognitive ability (Frederick, 2005; Burks et al., 2009;
Dohmen et al., 2010). We  ﬁnd that neither working memory nor receptive language performance predicts risk-tolerance for
either gender, but inhibitory control as measured by the head-to-toes task is associated with lower risk tolerance in boys.
While the age of the child has no predictive power for girls, there seems to be a signiﬁcant relationship for boys. A boy who is
1 year older invests on average 7.4 percentage points more. Note, however, that since all children in this sample are between
6.8 and 8.9 years old, this estimate is based on limited age variation. Among girls, household size is negatively related to risk
tolerance. Girls in families with one additional household member invest on average 1.4 percentage points less.
13 In 59% of all cases, either the mother or the child (or both) invest half of their tokens. When we  re-estimate the speciﬁcation presented in Table 2 excluding
these  observations, we ﬁnd qualitatively similar results. For girls, the coefﬁcient on mother’s risk taking behavior remains positive and signiﬁcant (  ˇ = 0.41,
p-value = 0.001), while for boys the coefﬁcient remains small and statistically insigniﬁcant (  ˇ = 0.07, p-value = 0.57). This allows us to rule out that the
results are driven by similarity in terms of heuristic use.
14 This result stands in contrast with Kimball et al. (2009), who  ﬁnd no evidence of differential transmission across gender. Their subjects are adult children
and  they use a non-incentivized risk tolerance measure.
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Table  3
Mother’s effort and children’s risk tolerance (0–1).
Linear speciﬁcation Dummy variable speciﬁcation Broader effort measure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys
Mother’s risk (0–1) −0.469** −0.110 0.0391 0.0132 0.0176 0.0280
(0.202) (0.377) (0.0675) (0.133) (0.0797) (0.130)
Mother’s effort −0.0447 −0.0522
(0.0288) (0.0425)
Mother’s effort × mother’s risk 0.158** 0.0276
(0.0482) (0.0821)
Medium effort −0.0905 −0.0313 −0.0678 −0.0293
(0.0578) (0.0893) (0.0548) (0.0735)
High  effort −0.0989* −0.0988 −0.124** −0.0349
(0.0494) (0.0626) (0.0560) (0.0996)
Medium effort × mother’s risk 0.265* −0.0559 0.267** 0.0320
(0.128) (0.144) (0.115) (0.127)
High  effort × mother’s risk 0.301** 0.0345 0.355** −0.0835
(0.0855) (0.173) (0.117) (0.224)
N  307 371 307 371 306 368
Regional FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.21 0.18 0.22 0.18 0.22 0.18
Both mother’s and child’s risk tolerance is measured on a 0–1 scale.
Household and individual controls as in Table 2.
Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the region level).
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While the socio-economic status of the family does not affect the risk tolerance of boys, it has large effects on girls.
ompared to girls in the highest wealth quartile, girls in the lowest quartile invest on average 14.2 percentage points more.
his result is interesting, given that most studies of adults ﬁnd that wealthier individuals are more risk tolerant. The degree
f religiosity and the mothers’ and fathers’ years of education are not associated with children’s behavior.
To investigate which characteristics of the regions may  be relevant to risk tolerance, we estimate the same regressions
xcluding regional ﬁxed effects but including average wealth, average religiosity and the percentage of right-wing votes in
he region in the previous election. None of these variables are signiﬁcant predictors of children’s risk tolerance, therefore
emaining results in this section are generated by models including regional ﬁxed effects.
To shed more light on the transmission mechanism, we investigate whether the transmission of preferences is affected
y the level of effort the mother exerts in raising her child.15 If the positive transmission coefﬁcient we  ﬁnd for girls is due to
 socialization process, we would expect the coefﬁcient to be higher for those daughters whose mothers exert higher effort
n their child’s upbringing. To test this, we allow the mother’s effort measure, which is based on the questions that elicit
aternal involvement in child’s academic activities, to affect the degree to which preferences are transmitted. Consistently
ith a model in which socialization matters for the transmission of preferences, the risk tolerance of more involved mothers
s more closely associated with the risk tolerance of their daughters (Table 3, Column 1). A similar interaction effect is not
etected for sons (Table 3, Column 2).
In order to investigate the robustness of this relationship, we  estimate several alternative speciﬁcations. First, to check for
ossible nonlinearities, we divide the mothers into three groups of equal size, depending on the degree of effort they exert
hen raising their child (Table 3, Columns 3 and 4). This speciﬁcation conﬁrms that the association between the mothers’
isk preferences and the daughters’ risk preferences is signiﬁcantly higher for high-effort and medium-effort mothers than
or mothers who exert low effort. For a high-effort mother, an increase in her risk tolerance by 10 percentage points is
ssociated with an additional 3.4 percentage points of risk tolerance in her daughter. The corresponding ﬁgure for low
ffort mothers is 0.4 percentage points (which is positive, but not statistically different from zero).16 While the transmission
oefﬁcient of medium-effort mothers does not differ signiﬁcantly from the transmission coefﬁcient of high-effort mothers,
he point estimate is smaller in magnitude, which suggests a monotonic association between the mother’s level of effort and
he degree to which her preferences are transmitted. Again, no such effect can be found for boys. Second, we  conduct the
nalysis using the broader deﬁnition of effort, which includes responses to questions unrelated to academic involvement.
15 Note that since we  do not have a reliable measure for paternal effort, our focus is only on maternal effort.
16 Note that in the linear speciﬁcation (Column 1) the direct association between mother’s and child’s choices is negative due to extrapolation. Put another
ay, this is for a mother with zero effort, which is outside the range of the data. Column (3) makes clear that for all ranges of effort observed in the data,
he  association is positive (though not statistically different from zero for the lowest effort tercile).
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Table 4
Robustness tests (1).
Additional parenting controls Employment status
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Girls Boys Girls Boys
Mother’s risk (0–1) 0.0493 0.0158 0.239*** 0.0219
(0.0705) (0.144) (0.0722) (0.0796)
Medium effort −0.0721 −0.0200
(0.0575) (0.0969)
High effort −0.0829 −0.0971
(0.0493) (0.0727)
Medium effort × mother’s risk 0.257** −0.0730
(0.116) (0.155)
High effort × mother’s risk 0.301*** 0.0463
(0.0847) (0.180)
Mother works 0.0408 0.0263
(0.0633) (0.105)
Mother works × mother’s risk −0.00154 −0.0434
(0.131) (0.219)
Parenting behaviours
“Obedience demanding” 0.000668 −0.0110 0.00616 −0.0117
(0.0220) (0.0184) (0.0239) (0.0191)
“Punishment” −0.0312 0.0245 −0.0359 0.0226
(0.0338) (0.0164) (0.0341) (0.0174)
“Parental warmth” 0.0124 0.0207 0.0124 0.0191
(0.0215) (0.0219) (0.0232) (0.0192)
“Inductive reasoning” −0.0480*** −0.0245 −0.0444*** −0.0285
(0.0137) (0.0273) (0.0138) (0.0262)
N  307 371 310 375
Regional FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.24 0.19 0.21 0.18
Both mother’s and child’s risk tolerance is measured on a 0–1 scale.
Household and individual controls as in Table 2.
Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the region level).
* p < .1.
** p < .05.
*** p < .01.
The results obtained with this broader deﬁnition of effort are remarkably similar to the previous estimates (Table 3, Columns
5 and 6).
We  next check whether our results are robust to the inclusion of other controls related to parenting. The regression
results in Table 4 use the mother’s effort measure based on academic involvement and additionally control for parenting
behaviors (Columns 1 and 2). The results reveal that girls whose mothers score high on a measure which captures the
degree to which she promotes inductive reasoning are less risk tolerant, a ﬁnding that is similar to that found for inhibitory
control among boys. More importantly, our results regarding the transmission of maternal preferences and the moderation
of that transmission by maternal effort are robust to the inclusion of these parenting behaviors. Additionally, none of these
parenting behaviors signiﬁcantly interact with maternal risk tolerance, indicating that transmission is not inﬂuenced by the
approach to parenting, but rather by involvement.
Next we investigate whether we would ﬁnd a similar result if we used the employment status of the mother as a proxy
for the degree of interaction between the mothers and their children. Maternal employment proxies time available for
children, whereas the measures described above capture active involvement. Interestingly, whether the mother works
does not have a signiﬁcant effect on the degree to which her preferences are transmitted (Table 4, Columns 3 and 4). This
observation is consistent with the ﬁnding in the literature that working mothers do not spend less quality time with their
children (Carneiro et al., 2013). This suggests that it is the degree of involvement rather than mere presence that matters
for preference transmission; however, the percentage of working mothers being small in our sample (17%) may  limit the
power of this test.17
17 We also explore other speciﬁcations with interactions such as the mother’s education and the child’s cognitive ability, measured by the Corsi test,
the  head-to-toe test as well as the Turkish receptive language test. We do not ﬁnd any moderating effect of these measures in the transmission of risk
preferences. More importantly, adding these interactions to our main speciﬁcation does not change the result that the association between the mothers’
risk  preferences and the daughters’ risk preferences is signiﬁcantly higher for higher effort mothers.
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Table  5
Predictors of mother’s effort.
(1) (2)
Mother’s education (years) 0.0277** 0.0316**
(0.0113) (0.0123)
Mother’s Turkish test score 0.00183 0.00360
(0.00723) (0.00669)
Mother’s memory test score 0.0211*** 0.0230***
(0.00680) (0.00692)
Age −0.00816 −0.00827
(0.00567) (0.00540)
Number of kids −0.0706 −0.0835*
(0.0476) (0.0438)
SES 1st quartile (low) −0.0339 −0.0872
(0.122) (0.115)
SES 2nd quartile 0.0736 0.0408
(0.0517) (0.0584)
SES 3rd quartile 0.112* 0.0929
(0.0592) (0.0617)
Male −0.0595
(0.0423)
Mother works −0.117*
(0.0624)
Parenting behaviours
“Obedience demanding” −0.0178
(0.0505)
“Punishment” −0.00222
(0.0311)
“Parental warmth” 0.0631
(0.0419)
“Inductive reasoning” 0.130**
(0.0470)
N 771 771
Regional FE Yes Yes
R2 0.36 0.32
Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the region level).
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Overall, our results are consistent with the hypothesis that socialization plays a crucial role in the intergenerational
ransmission of preferences. However, we have no plausible instruments for parental effort. One of several threats to a
ausal interpretation of our ﬁndings (from parental effort to preference transmission) is that there may  be reverse causality
unning from the child to the effort of the mother. For example, daughters who are more similar to their mother may  induce
heir mother to be more engaged in parenting. To investigate whether our results are driven by reverse causality, we examine
hether the transmission of preferences is also increasing in the mother’s effort if we use a measure of effort that is unlikely
o be responsive to the child’s characteristics. In particular, we  only use that part of the variation in maternal effort that can
e predicted by variables that are predetermined or unlikely to be affected by the characteristics of the child.
First, we estimate a model that predicts the measure of mother’s effort. We  ﬁnd that the mother’s years of education
nd her score on a cognitive ability test are signiﬁcant predictors of effort (Table 5, Column 1). Cognitively skilled and
ighly educated mothers exert a higher level of effort. In terms of parenting behaviors, the degree to which the mother
ses inductive reasoning is positively related to her effort. To obtain a measure of effort that is not responsive to the child’s
haracteristics, we predict effort based on a subset of the variables used in Column 1 of Table 5. In particular, we use stable
aternal characteristics to obtain predicted values for maternal effort. These maternal characteristics, which are unlikely
o be altered in response to child characteristics, include cognitive ability, education and socioeconomic status (Column 2).
hese variables explain 32% of the variation in actual effort.18
We  use this predicted effort measure to redo the analysis from Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3, interacting the mother’s risk
olerance with predicted, rather than measured, effort. The results are presented in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 6 and reveal
hat just as in the benchmark model, mothers who have higher predicted values of effort are better able to transmit their
references. We are emphatically not claiming that our predictors of maternal effort are valid instruments, but only that
hey are predetermined. Thus the association of higher predicted effort with greater mother–daughter correlation in risk
18 If we use the broader deﬁnition of maternal effort, which was  used in Columns 5 and 6 of Table 3, we  can explain even more of the variation in effort,
nd  socioeconomic status becomes a more signiﬁcant predictor of maternal effort.
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Table 6
Robustness tests (2).
Predicted mother’s effort Father’s effort
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Girls Boys Girls Boys
Mother’s risk (0–1) −1.246*** 0.954 0.0542 0.0767
(0.345) (0.839) (0.0569) (0.0783)
Predicted mother’s effort × mother’s risk 0.346*** −0.211
(0.0829) (0.205)
High mother’s effort/high father’s effort −0.0677 0.0754
(0.0818) (0.250)
High  mother’s effort/low father’s effort −0.139*** −0.0276
(0.0454) (0.0554)
High/high × mother’s risk 0.258* −0.228
(0.127) (0.484)
High/low × mother’s risk 0.346*** −0.0898
(0.0743) (0.132)
N  310 373 296 350
Regional FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.22 0.20 0.23 0.21
Both mother’s and child’s risk tolerance is measured on a 0–1 scale.
Household and individual controls also include all additional variables used.
To predict the effort of the mother.
Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the region level).
** p < .05.
* p < .1.
*** p < .01.tolerance is evidence against reverse causality from child characteristics to maternal effort, but it does not preclude other
sources of endogeneity in maternal effort.
Indeed, the high correlations between maternal effort and measures of maternal ability, education, and parenting behav-
iors highlight the possibility that it is not effort per se that moderates attitude transmission but some other variable in this
highly correlated set of parental characteristics and behaviors. Given the degree of correlation between these variables, it
is difﬁcult to disentangle the attributes that underlie the interaction between maternal effort and maternal risk tolerance.
What we can report, however, is that if we test the speciﬁcation in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 6 against more general spec-
iﬁcations with multiple interaction effects, the restrictions implied by our preferred speciﬁcation (with predicted effort as
the only moderating variable) are never rejected.19
Finally, we investigate whether the degree to which the mother’s preferences are transmitted depends on how involved
she reports the father to be in the child’s upbringing, while being cautious in interpreting the results as the father’s involve-
ment is reported by the mother in our data. For this purpose, we divide the children into three groups: children whose
parents are both reported to exert high effort (6.3% of the sample), children whose mothers report to exert high effort but
whose fathers are reported to exert little effort (42.1%), and children whose parents are both reported to exert low effort
(50.4%).20 We  then repeat our regression analysis, but allow the transmission of preferences to differ across these three
different groups.
Compared to mothers who exert little effort, mothers who  are highly involved are found to be better able to transmit
their preferences to their daughters, irrespective of how highly involved they report the father to be (Columns 3 and 4
of Table 6). The point estimate of the transmission coefﬁcient is slightly lower if the father is also highly involved, which
suggests some substitutability, although the difference between the two  coefﬁcients is not statistically signiﬁcant. Again we
ﬁnd no signiﬁcant associations for boys. Since household composition and parental effort are both likely to be endogenous,
and given that we do not have any information on fathers’ risk preferences, and their self-reported parental effort, we
cannot draw strong conclusions about the role of fathers from this analysis. More research is needed to understand how the
preferences of fathers play a role in the formation of children’s preferences.19 Full results are available from the authors.
20 We choose the cut-off for mothers such that we  obtain two equally sized groups. We then apply the same cut-off value to categorize fathers. For the
purpose of this analysis we exclude observations from the fourth group (mother exerts little effort, father exerts high effort) because there are very few
observations in this category (1.2%).
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. Discussion
In this study we utilize a unique survey of mothers and their children to examine risk tolerance in children and to
ocument the intergenerational correlation in risk attitudes. In this survey, both mothers and their children participated
n an incentivized risk preference elicitation task. We  ﬁnd that risk tolerance is associated with gender even among young
hildren. This suggests either that risk tolerance is biologically dependent on sex, or that socialization processes that inﬂuence
ender differences in risk tolerance act very early in life.
One of the key ﬁndings of the literature on risk tolerance in adults is a strong positive association with cognitive ability.
n 7–8 year-old children we ﬁnd no association of risk tolerance with cognitive measures including verbal and non-verbal
bilities. However, in these children we ﬁnd a negative association between a measure of inhibitory control and risk tolerance
n boys. Thus, boys with better ability to regulate their reactions or responses were less risk tolerant, likely because they
onsidered the consequences of losing alongside the possibility of winning. Inhibitory control is considered to be an important
omponent of a set of cognitive abilities labeled executive function. Executive function is a key cognitive ability that allows
ndividuals to coordinate thoughts and actions, facilitating capacities such as planning, prioritizing goals and orchestrating
ehavior accordingly. These results suggest that the association between different aspects of cognitive ability and risk
olerance may  change over individual lifetimes. It is likely that risk tolerance is closely associated with the abilities to
nalyze and synthesize, as well as regulatory abilities. A high level of regulatory abilities without analytic abilities (as in
hildren) may  result in risk aversion, while a low level of regulatory abilities may  result in greater risk tolerance regardless
f analytic abilities. Nevertheless, the link between risk tolerance and cognitive abilities clearly requires further study from
 developmental perspective.
Turning to intergenerational transmission, our main ﬁnding is that risk preferences are correlated between mothers and
hildren when the children are just 7–8 years old, a much younger cohort than studied in previous research on intergenera-
ional correlations in risk preferences. Interestingly, in this sample only the daughters’ risk preferences are correlated with
heir mothers’ risk preferences.21 Differential transmission of mothers’ preferences to daughters and sons may  support a
ole for socialization in the transmission of preferences, if girls are more likely to take mothers as role models than boys.
owever, differential transmission could also be genetic, or more speciﬁcally, sex-linked.
We further document that the strength of the intergenerational transmission of risk tolerance appears to depend on
aternal effort. We ﬁnd a robust relationship between the mother’s effort and the degree to which her preferences are
ransmitted to the daughter. While we cannot rule out all possible sources of endogeneity, we  ﬁnd evidence against reverse
ausality (from child behavior or characteristics to maternal effort) as an explanation for this association. The moderation of
he mother–daughter correlation in risk preferences by parental effort is consistent with the hypothesis that socialization
lays a key role in the intergenerational transmission of attitudes. This hypothesis – that parents can inﬂuence the transmis-
ion of preferences through socialization effort – is a key assumption in recent theoretical models of the intergenerational
ersistence of outcomes. An important caveat is worth re-emphasizing. While we do have rich data on maternal effort
nd show that this effort seems to moderate the association between the risk attitudes of mothers and daughters, the evi-
ence we provide is only suggestive of a socialization mechanism. Designs with the power to identify possible transmission
echanisms will do especially well in future research in this fast-growing area.
The study is a contribution to the literature on the role of the family in the formation of preferences that predict economic
ehavior. The result that preferences of mothers and their children are correlated when the children are still young as well
s the possible role of maternal effort in shaping children’s preferences suggest that the formation of preferences occurs very
arly in life. Assessing the possibility that preferences are malleable and can be shaped, not only in the home but potentially
lso through schools and other educational interventions is an important part of our continuing research agenda.
ppendix A. Questionnaires
.1. Parental involvement in the child’s school life
In two separate sets of questions, mothers are asked to report how often they and their husbands engage in the following
ctivities with their child:22 (1: never, 2: rarely, 3: sometimes, 4: often, 5: always)1 Meet with the child’s teachers.
2 Watch the child’s performances at school.
3 Accompany the child to school on the ﬁrst and last day of classes.
4 Help the child with his/her school projects.
21 Unpublished work by Zumbuehl et al. (2013) documents a similar relationship using adult children (ages 17+), retrospective rather than contempo-
aneous parental involvement questions, and self-assessed risk measures rather than an incentivized task. Their results provide support that the early
ransmission we  document persists into adulthood.
22 Note that the mother was asked to report her own and her husband’s involvement in the upbringing of the target child only, i.e. the child which was
art  of the TECGE study.
74 S. Alan et al. / Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 134 (2017) 60–77
5 Help the child with his/her Turkish writing/reading homework.
6 Help the child with his/her math homework.
7 Show interest/get involved if the child has problems with his/her teachers.
8 Inform the school when the child is sick.
9 Do the shopping for items which are necessary for school.
10 Follow the child’s school work by checking workbooks etc.
A.2. Maternal involvement in other activities
Mothers are also asked to report how often they engage in the following activities with their child.
1 Do you help your child gain skills, such as skipping rope or swimming? (1: always, 2: sometimes, 3: never)
2 How often did you engage in any family activity during the last week (like playing something indoors or doing some activity
outdoors)? (1: a couple of times, 2: once, 3: never)
3 Did you take your child to any show, like a concert, a children’s theater, or a puppet show within the last year? (1: a couple of
times, 2: once, 3: never)
4 Did you go on a bus, plane or train ride with your child within the last year? (1: a couple of times, 2: once, 3: never)
5 Did you visit a museum or art gallery with your child within the last year? (1: a couple of times, 2: once, 3: never)
6 Did you travel to any other place (village, another town etc.) with your child for leisure, within the last year? (1: a couple of
times, 2: once, 3: never)
7 Within the past month, how many times did you take your child somewhere just because your child enjoys going there? (provide
number of times)
8 Within last year, did your child accompany you or your husband to your/his workplace? (1: a couple of times, 2: once, 3: never)
9 Do you, as a family, meet with your friends and relatives at least two times every month? (1: yes, 2: no)
10 Do you encourage your child to get/keep a hobby, such as sports or music? (1: always, 2: sometimes, 3: rarely)
11 Do you encourage your child to read? (1: always, 2: sometimes, 3: rarely)
12 Do you make your child participate in activities which improve his/her skills? (1 yes, 2 no)
13 Do you comfort your child when he/she is worried? (1: always, 2: sometimes, 3: never)
Appendix B. Verbatim instructions and procedures
B.1. Children’s risk task
[Instructions given to interviewer: If possible, the child should be alone when playing this game. In case this is not possible, any
intervention or comments by the mother should be prevented to the extent possible. If this occurs, please take note.]
[Record: Was  the mother present while the child was playing the game?]
[Instructions to be given to the child:]
We will now play a game with you. [Show the child the prize bag.] See, this bag contains many gift items. You can earn
prizes out of this gift bag at the end of the game. How many gifts you will get will depend on a decision you make during
the game. Now I will explain the rules. Please listen very carefully, OK?
Here are 4 tokens. Each one of these tokens corresponds to a gift of your choice from the gift bag. The more tokens you
have at the end of the game, the more gifts you can choose out of the gift bag.
Now, here is a bowl [point to the bowl]. Out of the 4 tokens that you have, you can put as many tokens into this bowl as
you want. You can keep the tokens you do not put in the bowl. They are yours. Now, what will happen to the tokens you put
in the bowl depends on chance. They will either multiply, or be lost. But what will this depend on?
There are two balls in this bag. [Show opaque bag and the two balls.] You will pick one of them without looking. The yellow
one is the good ball. If you draw the yellow ball from the bag, the tokens you put in the bowl will triple, which means that
you will win three times the number of tokens you had put in the bowl. The purple ball is the bad ball. If the purple ball
comes out of the bag, you will lose the tokens you had put in the bowl. So the probability of winning–losing is half–half. It
will depend on which ball you draw out of the bag.
Now let us do an example:
Say you put one token into the bowl, and kept the remaining three [demonstrate by putting one token into the bowl].
Suppose the yellow ball came out. In that case, each token in the bowl becomes three tokens [put two more tokens in the
bowl], and you kept three tokens, so see, it adds up to six in total. You get to take six gifts from the prize bag. Suppose the
purple ball came out. Then you lose the token you had put in the bowl. The 3 tokens you kept are yours though. So, you get
three gifts.
Let us do another example. Suppose you put three tokens into the bowl and kept one [demonstrate by putting three tokens
into the bowl]. Say you drew the yellow ball. Then each token in the bowl becomes three tokens [put six more tokens into the
bowl], and you kept one token, so this makes ten tokens in total. You get to choose ten gifts from the prize bag. Say you draw
the purple ball. Then you lose the tokens you put into the bowl. You choose one gift for the one token that you kept. Are the
rules of the game clear?
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[Answer any questions the child has about the game. Then ask the child the following questions. Do not start the game before
he child answers these questions correctly.]
Suppose you kept all four tokens, and put none of the tokens into the bowl. How many gifts do you get ? [Right answer:
our.]
Suppose you put all four tokens into the bowl, and keep none of the tokens. How many gifts do you get? [Right answer:
f the yellow ball comes out, the tokens in the bowl triple, i.e. 4 × 3 =12, and the number of gifts is 12. If the purple ball comes out,
he number of gifts is zero.]
Suppose you put two tokens into the bowl, and keep two  tokens. The yellow ball comes out. How many gifts do you get?
Right answer: 6 + 2 =8] Suppose the purple ball comes out. How many gifts do you get? [Right answer: 0 + 2 =2.]
[Begin the game once you are sure that the child has understood the game.]
Now please think carefully and decide how many of your tokens you want to put into the bowl. Keep in mind that we
ill only play this game once.
[Record: How many tokens did the child put into the bowl? How many did the child keep?]
[Record: Did the mother say anything that might have affected the child’s decision?]
.2. Mother’s risk task
[Instructions given to interviewer: This game should be played after the child has made his/her choices.]
[Instructions to be given to the mother:] Now we  will play a game. You can earn money in this game and we will pay you
mmediately after the game is completed. How much you earn will depend on a decision you will make during the game.
The rules are simple. Here are 10 tokens [show tokens].  Each one of these tokens corresponds to 1 TL. So, you have 10 TL.
ere is a bowl. You will decide how many of your 10 tokens to put into the bowl. You will be able to keep the tokens you
ecide not to put into the bowl. They are yours no matter what. Concerning the tokens you put into the bowl, you can think
f it as a lottery. The money you put into the bowl will either multiply, or be lost. So there is the possibility of a good outcome
nd the possibility of a bad outcome. If the good outcome occurs, any money you put into the bowl will triple, so you will
ave three times the amount of money you had put into the bowl. If the bad outcome occurs, you will lose the money you
ad put into the bowl.
Here is how the outcome – whether the money in the bowl will multiply or disappear – will be determined. Once you
ave decided how many tokens to put into the bowl, you will draw a ball from this bag. There are two balls in this bag. One
ellow, and one purple. [Show opaque bag and the balls.] If you draw the yellow ball, the tokens you had put into the bowl
ill triple. If you draw the purple ball, the tokens you had put into the bowl will be lost. Since there is exactly one yellow
all and one purple ball in the bag, you have a 50–50 chance of drawing each of the balls. If you draw the yellow ball, i.e. if
he good outcome occurs, the money you will earn is three times the money you put into the bowl, plus the money you had
ecided to keep. If you draw the purple ball, i.e. if the bad outcome occurs, you will only earn the money you had decided to
eep, since the money you had decided to put into the bowl will be lost. Do you have any questions?
Now let us do some examples. If you do not put any of the tokens into the bowl, what happens? You get to keep all of
hem, and earn 10 TL. You could also put all of the ten tokens into the bowl. In this case, your 10 tokens, meaning your 10
L, will become 10 × 3 =30 TL if you draw the yellow ball. If instead you draw the purple ball, you will lose all of the tokens.
emember that you can put as many tokens into the bowl as you want.
For example, suppose you put 7 of the 10 TL into the bowl, and kept 3. The 3TL that you decided to keep are yours, no
atter what. If you draw the yellow ball, the money you put into the bowl will be tripled and becomes: 7 × 3 =21 TL. Since
ou kept 3 tokens, your total earnings would be 3 + 21 = 24 TL. If you draw the purple ball, you lose the money you had put
nto the bowl. You get the 3TL that you had decided to keep.
Let us do another example. Suppose you put 3 tokens into the bowl and decided to keep 7. How much money do you
arn if you draw the yellow ball? [Let mother answer ﬁrst.] If you draw the yellow ball, the money you have put into the bowl
ill be tripled: 3 × 3 =9 TL. And since you decided to keep 7 tokens, you will earn 9 + 7 = 16 TL in total. How much do you
arn if you draw the purple ball? [Let mother answer ﬁrst.] If you draw the purple ball, then you lose the money you put into
he bowl. You get the 7TL you decided to keep. Do you have any questions? [Answer any questions the mother has about the
ame.]
We will play this game only once. Each token you do not put into the bowl is 1TL that you keep. Each token you put into
he bowl will either triple or be lost. What happens to the amount in the bowl will depend on the color of the ball that you
raw. Please think carefully and put as many tokens into the bowl as you wish.
[Record: How many tokens did the mother put into the bowl? How many did she keep?]
[Once the child and the mother have made their choices and their choices are recorded, the interviewer asks the child and
he mother to draw a ball from the bag, on the basis of which their payoffs are calculated. The child is then asked to choose the
orresponding number of toys from the gift bag, while the mother is given her payment in TL.]ppendix C. Robustness analyses
See Tables A.1 and A.2.
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Table A.1
Predictors of children’s risk tolerance (0–1).
(1) (2)
Girls Boys
Mother’s risk (0–1) (ˇ1) 0.228*** 0.0149
(0.0628) (0.0830)
Mother present 0.0133 −0.0137
(0.0296) (0.0177)
Corsi test 0.00225 0.00187
(0.00217) (0.00212)
Turkish receptive language test −0.0000382 0.00113
(0.00143) (0.00103)
Head–toe task −0.00202 −0.00655***
(0.00164) (0.00146)
Child age (months) −0.000384 0.00750**
(0.00485) (0.00325)
Height 0.00270 0.00413
(0.00205) (0.00243)
Religiosity 0.000213 0.000274
(0.000687) (0.000581)
Household size −0.0137* −0.0151
(0.00659) (0.00978)
Mother’s education (years) 0.00666 0.00108
(0.00657) (0.00432)
Father’s education (years) −0.00449 0.00254
(0.00529) (0.00347)
SES 1st quartile (low) 0.141** 0.0445
(0.0653) (0.0750)
SES 2nd quartile 0.190*** 0.0395
(0.0527) (0.0695)
SES 3rd quartile 0.0439 0.0192
(0.0403) (0.0456)
N  311 375
Regional FE Yes Yes
R2 0.19 0.17
Test ˇ1(girls) = ˇ1(boys) 0.03
Both mother’s and child’s risk tolerance is measured on a 0–1 scale.
Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the region level).
* p < .1.
** p < .05.
*** p < .01.
Table A.2
Mother’s effort and children’s risk tolerance (0–1).
(1) (2)
Girls Boys
Mother’s risk (0–1) −0.552** −0.175
(0.215) (0.393)
Mother’s effort −0.0442 −0.0514
(0.0297) (0.0418)
Mother’s effort × mother’s risk 0.160*** 0.0240
(0.0493) (0.0805)
Mother present −0.0654 −0.0841
(0.0701) (0.0497)
Mother present × mother’s risk 0.146 0.161
(0.131) (0.102)
N 307 371
Regional FE Yes Yes
Household controls Yes Yes
Individual controls Yes Yes
R2 0.219 0.186
Both mother’s and child’s risk tolerance is measured on a 0–1 scale.
Household and individual controls as in Table 2.
Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the region level).
* p < .1.
** p < .05.
*** p < .01.
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